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Plea bargains are replacing trials in modem criminal cases at an astonishingly fast pace. Statistics confirm that approximately 97%2 of all federal
criminal cases subject to minimum sentencing guidelines resolve in plea
agreements between defendants and prosecutors.3 Once rare and disfavored
by judges, plea bargains are now universally used with too much judicial
participation via a "partnership with the prosecution.
Trial lawyers are
evolving into "plea lawyers."' Jury trials are seen primarily in the movies.
The plea mentality has even manifested itself in civil litigation: the number
of civil cases going to trial in federal courts has declined from 11.5% in

1962 to around merely

1%.6

What explains this recent phenomenon? Severe sentencing guidelines
and mandatory minimum sentences have armed prosecutors with the near
unilateral power to compel a defendant to forego the jury trial and instead
enter into a plea agreement. Such unchecked discretion in the hands of
prosecutors effectively criminalizes the defendant's exercise of his right to
a jury trial. Moreover, the prosecutorial authority to compel defendants,
especially those charged with white-collar crimes, into plea bargains has
fundamentally converted the adversarial system of criminal justice into an
inquisitorial legal system.
Plea bargaining is not an acceptable substitute for jury trials. Trials rely
on the adversarial process to seek out the truth, expose corruption, and protect individual rights. The presence of a jury acts as a constitutional
safeguard, shining a light on the actions of prosecutors and judges. By contrast, plea bargaining operates more like an inquisitorial system in which
the prosecutor assumes the dual role of fact finder and ultimate decision2. In 2010, 89% of all federal criminal defendants who were indicted had their case disposed of
through a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. In 85% of all such cases, where federal minimum sentencing guidelines were applicable, 97% of all convictions were obtained through a guilty plea, with merely
3% having been convicted following a trial.
CRIMINAL

JUSTICE

STATISTICS

See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF

ONLINE

[hereinafter

SOURCEBOOK],

tbl.

5.22.2010,

http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf. See also SOURCEBOOK, tbl 5.34.2010 (May 26,
2011), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5342010.pdf.
3.

DAVID

K. SHIPLER,

RIGHTS AT RISK:

THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY IN MODERN AMERICA

115,(2012).
4. Interview with Roy Black, Professor, University of Miami School of Law, in Miami, Fla.
(2015) (interview notes on file with author); see also J.S Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty,
THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty (noting that "it is the prosecutor, not the judge, who
effectively exercises the sentencing power, albeit cloaked as a charging decision" and that "there is no
way defense counsel can appeal to a neutral third party, the judge, since in all but a few jurisdictions, the
judiciary is precluded from participating in plea bargain negotiations.").
5. Scott W. Howe, The Perilous Psychology of Public Defending, 2015 J. PROF. LAW. 157, 169
(2015).
6. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (nothing that "[t]he portion of
federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5 percent in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002.").
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maker, selecting who to indict, what charges to bring, and what sentence to
impose. While trials seek to discern guilt from innocence, the plea bargain
seeks to expedite the case, relieving the prosecutor from the burden of conducting a trial or meeting the evidentiary burden required for conviction.
Unlike trials conducted in open court, plea bargaining is conducted in secrecy.
Plea bargaining is not necessarily bad in and of itself, but its extreme
overuse raises concerns about the U.S. criminal justice system.7 The pleabargaining process does not afford any constitutional or ethical protections.'
For example, suppose police obtain evidence illegally, without a warrant.
Prosecutors would prefer to keep a case built on warrantless evidence out of
court rather than have the illegal police conduct exposed at trial. 9 A defendant arrested on the basis of illegally obtained evidence, and facing the
threat of significant jail time, may be pressured to accept a plea agreement
without having had any opportunity to review evidence meaningfully.'o
Modern plea bargain practice encourages a defendant to admit guilt to a
lesser offense on questionable evidence, and accepts a lesser punishment in
exchange for sacrificing the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial. As
the Fifth Circuit once observed, "[j]ustice and liberty are not the subjects of
bargaining and barter."" The current criminal justice system adopts bargaining as naturally as if the Founding Fathers had indeed incorporated it
into the Sixth Amendment.12
While plea bargains originally were used as a practical compromise between an overburdened prosecutor and a defendant of certain guilt, modernday plea bargains resemble one-sided contracts of adhesion 3 favoring a
prosecutor too often holding insufficient evidence14 gainst a criminal defendant, particularly a white-collar defendant, who is reasonably and understandably unwilling to risk being sentenced to purgatory under current sen7. Audio recording at 10:45-11:02: Attorney Kelly Vomacka, speaking at Smoke Farm Symposium, (Aug. 22, 2015), http://kuow.org/post/how-plea-bargains-made-jury-trials-anachronism-us.
8. Id. at 13:30.
9. James F. Parker, Plea Bargaining, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 187, 204 (1972) (stating that "a prosecutor whose case rests upon evidence of dubious admissibility for example, a confession obtained unconstitutionally or the fruits of an illegal search may seek to avoid a challenge to his evidence by
offering the defendant a particularly attractive 'deal'.").
10. Id at 205 ("Since prosecutors will, of course, make the best offers in cases with the weakest
evidence, the prevalence of plea bargaining may mean that in the vast majority of criminal cases the
exclusionary rule ... is replaced with a sliding scale of constitutionality.").
11. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957), judgment set aside, 246 F.2d
571(enbanc), rev'dper curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
12. Rakoff, supra note 4.
13. Id
14. See Gabriel Hallevy, The Defense Attorney as Mediator in Plea Bargains, 9 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 495, 495 (2009).
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tencing guidelines." A rational defendant, particularly in federal court,
cannot risk refusing a prosecutor's plea offer: prosecutors punish those who
reject plea agreements by stacking additional charges' 6 and, particularly in
the cases of white-collar crimes, rely on sentencing guidelines that take into
account the size of the financial loss without any requirement that the defendant be found to have intended the loss.' 7 On average, the defendant
who turns down a plea offer and is later convicted receives a sentence three
times longer than under a plea agreement." Combined with a growing list
of vague and poorly drafted statutes defining various crimes, prosecutors
can target individuals and coerce them into plea bargains by promising to
drop charges against family members' 9 and freezing assets.20
By punishing the defendant with a sentence three times longer if convicted at trial, modern day plea bargaining does not entail the same degree of
"voluntary" and "intelligent choice" made by the defendant as authorized
by the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States.2 ' While acknowledging
the utility or impossibility of getting rid of plea bargains in the modem
criminal justice system, this article stresses the unconstitutional effect of the
unchecked discretion enjoyed by prosecutors when coupled with incredibly
long sentences for those who risk conviction at trial, especially in complex
white-collar criminal cases. The enormous disparity in sentencing resulting
from this practice effectively criminalizes the defendant's right to trial and
fundamentally alters the adversarial legal system. First conceived as a convenient procedural tool of expediency, modem plea bargain practice has
supplanted trials altogether, severely punishing those few who dare exercise
their Sixth Amendment right to trial.2 2 This article proposes a practical solution, one borrowed from the business world, to restore parity between
prosecutors and defendants charged in complex cases popularly associated
with white-collar crime.
Totalitarian societies, such as those envisioned by George Orwell in the
novel 1984, rely on an inquisitorial legal system in which the government
has absolute, unfettered discretion to selectively punish anyone and every-

15.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2131.1

(2015).

16. A well-known pain physician Dr. Jeri Hassman was charged with over 350 counts of "drug
dealing with a pen," which, during plea bargaining, was reduced to merely four counts. HARVEY
SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT 58-59 (2d ed. 2011)..

§ 2131.1

17.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

18.

Jamie Fellner, Plea bargains-theunfair difference between 10 years and life, HUMAN RIGHTS

(2015).

WATCH (Dec. 4,2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/04/plea-bargains-unfair-difference-between10-years-and-life.
19. See, e.g., State ex rel. White v. Gray, 203 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Wis. 1973).
20. See, e.g., Bauer v. State, No. A10-1164, 2011 WL 2518929, at *2 (Minn. 2011).
21. 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
22. Id. at 746.
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one. 23 Orwell grew up in the Soviet Union, where an inquisitorial-style judicial system sought to maximize government power at the expense of individual rights.24 The government enjoyed immense discretion to apply
vaguely-written laws to political opponents and other disfavored individuals. 25 Even today, countries such as Iran continue to exploit such prosecutorial mechanisms to suppress freedom of discourse.2 6
The sad irony is that, while the United States may have won the Cold
War, its legal institutions have gravitated toward resembling the inquisitorial system of its vanquished foe. In a true Orwellian twist, no citizen of
modem American society can possibly know all of his or her individual
legal obligations. For example, the Internal Revenue Code, inclusive of
criminal and civil statutes, comprises 73,000 pages of fine print.27 With
over 5,000 federal criminal laws on the books, one legal scholar has determined that the average person unknowingly commits three felonies every
day. 28 Doctors accepting Medicare payments, directors of publicly-traded
companies, and tax lawyers, among other white-collar professionals, often
operate in perpetual fear of the regulation state. Should their behavior attract the interest of a prosecutor, the prosecutor may find some crime, such
as obstruction of justice or conspiracy, to threaten in order to gain cooperation.2 9 Thus, under the current system of plea bargaining, the adversary
legal system is being severely undermined and an innocent individual is
sacrificed for the pretense of the public good and its insatiable need to regulate every aspect of individual life. As the hero in Arthur Koestler's Stalinist critique novel Darkness at Noon, pleads, "I plead guilty to having rated
the question of guilt and innocence higher than that of utility and harmfulness. Finally, I plead guilty to having placed the idea of man above the idea
of mankind." 3 0
23.

See Sinkwan Cheng, Ressentiment, The Superego, and Totalitarianism:George Orwell's 1984,

24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1109-10 (2003).
24. See John H. Minan & Grant H. Morris, Unraveling an Enigma: An Introduction to Soviet Law
and the Soviet Legal System, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 41 (1985).
25. See Ilya Nuzov, The Role of Political Elite in Transitional Justice in Russia: From False
"Nurumbergs"to FailedDesovietization,20 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 273, 283 (2014).
26.

See Asa Fitch, Washington Post Condemns Conviction oflts Iran Reporter, WALL ST. J. (Oct.

12,
2015)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-post-condemns-conviction-of-its-iran-reporter1444652990.
27. See Reid Kress Weisbord, The Advisory Function ofLaw, 90 TUL. L. REV. 129, 130 (2015).
28.
Silverglate, supra note 16, at xxv.
29. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("To punish a person because he has
done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an
agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his
legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional.' But in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such
element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's
offer."). (internal quotations omitted).
30. ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON 151 (Scriber 1968).
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THE PERVERSION OF PLEA BARGAINING AND
UNDERMINING THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

Plea BargainsAre Strictly a Modern Phenomenon

.

Plea bargains were "not explicitly noted in [] nineteenth-century dockets."3 American criminal court records of the early nineteenth century reveal that plea agreements were a rare phenomenon:
The judicial practice of discouraging guilty pleas persisted into the second
half of the nineteenth century, but at about this time prosecutorial plea
bargaining emerged. Of course a history of one hundred years or more
may be sufficient, from the perspective of some observers, to render plea
bargaining a venerable institution.32
The infrequent use of plea bargains owes to their disfavor among judges of
that era. As at least one court has held "[t]he least surprise or influence
causing [the defendant] to plead guilty when he had any defense at all
should be sufficient cause to permit a change of the plea from guilty to not
guilty."
With judicial hostility and distrust toward plea bargains, a nineteenthcentury lawyer would probably not expect to see plea bargains replace trials
as the normal resolution for most criminal cases.
Following the Civil War, there was a general increase in crime owing in
part to a rise in immigration.3 4 The subsequent increased use of plea bargaining "was a powerful system of social control through the
nonapplication of the law in ways that bore strong parallels to the British
system of episodic leniency but with a uniquely American turn."35 Plea
bargains offered a convenient method to process these cases without burdening the criminal justice system.3 6 Their use gained even greater notoriety
in the years after World War II, accounting for the resolution of 80% of all
criminal cases.37 Notwithstanding their widespread use, there still seemed to
be a fair opportunity for those who chose to go to trial.38 As Judge Rakoff
explains:
[T]here were enough cases still going to trial, and enough power remaining with defense counsel and with judges, to "keep the system honest" . .

31.

MARY E. VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE COURTS, AND THE

MAKING OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 29 (2007).

32. ALBERT ALSCHULER, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979).
33. Id. at 20, (quoting State v. Williams, 14 So. 32 (La. 1893)).
34. Rakoff, supranote 4.
35. Vogel, supra note 31 at 325.
36. Rakoff, supranote 4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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a genuinely innocent defendant could still choose to go to trial without
fearing that she might thereby subject herself to an extremely long prison
term effectively dictated by the prosecutor.3 9
The war waged on drug crimes in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in aggressively increased sentencing and the even more expansive use of plea bargains to resolve federal criminal cases. 40 The federal sentencing guidelines,
combined with mandatory minimums, instigated the "virtual extinction of
jury trials in federal criminal cases." 4 ' This enabled prosecutors "to bludgeon defendants into effectively coerced plea bargains."4 2 Statistics demonstrate that the percentage of cases resolved through plea agreements skyrocketed at this time: whereas 19% of all federal defendants in 1980 chose
to go to a trial, by the year 2000, fewer than 6% did so, and this dropped
further to merely 3% of all cases in 2010.43 This trend has not abated and,
to this day, less than 3% of all defendants in federal criminal cases opt to
risk a substantial sentencing disparity and challenge the indictment. 44
Supporters of modem plea bargain practice declare that plea bargaining
has been part of the judicial system "ever since man was made to account
for crimes against society."4 5 As one judge has proclaimed, "[p]lea bargains
have accompanied the whole history of this nation's criminal jurisprudence." 46 However, in his article noted above, Albert Alschuler, selfproclaimed maverick and law professor, disproves these claims through
credible research. He notes that "[a]s an opponent of plea bargaining, I have
been offended by these rhetorical historical pronouncements, and perhaps
even more offended by the seemingly knowledgeable but equally unsupported assertions of scholars that plea bargaining 'apparently originated in
seventeenth-century England as a means of mitigating unduly harsh punishment. '47
The simple fact is that plea bargains were the exception, and not the
norm, in historic criminal law practice. 4 8 Their widespread use in modem
times is an aberration that finds no justification in history. 49 Rather, the
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.

42. Id.
43.

Id.

44. Id.
45.

Alschuler, supranote 32, at 2.

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Vogel, supra note 31 at 94, (" Despite occasional instances of compromise, there is no evidence that anything approaching the pervasive and highly routinized practice of plea bargaining gaining
common to the United States had developed elsewhere before the late nineteenth century.").
49. Id. ("Pardons and grants of clemency, which tended to occur after sentencing, involved, prior
to the 1830s, no element of the direct, albeit often implicit, exchange inherent in plea bargaining.").
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overuse of plea bargains today represents the choice of expediency over
justice:
Providing a "break" because the defendant has relieved the victim's suffering or because he has brought other offenders to justice is not the same
as providing this break because the defendant has saved the government
the time, the expense, and the risk of trial. A sacrifice of penological interests seems less objectionable when it is incurred for the sake of compensatory interests or law enforcement interests than when it is incurred for the
sake of administrative interests.
The reluctance by judges in early American history to permit plea bargaining was likely based in part on the adversary system of justice, which was
prevalently regarded as essential to freedom and democracy. As noted by
the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, "a plea of guilty is
more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a
perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality."'
The criminal justice system in eighteenth-century England did not permit
the criminal defendant to use an attorney to establish facts at trial.5 2 A defendant had to appear pro se; while his defense attorney could argue legal
issues, the defense attorney "could not present evidence, examine or crossexamine witnesses, or address the jury in opening or closing statements." 53
By contrast, a prosecutor was allowed to have an attorney by his side at all
times.54 Trial was more like a sentencing hearing rather than a trial, and
"guilt was rarely challenged." 5 5 For unknown reasons, beginning in the
1730s, defense counsel was allowed to participate on a limited basis in
cross-examinations. 5 6
At the time of the American Revolution, the United States chose not to
duplicate England's criminal justice system wholesale, but to instead implement a more balanced adversarial approach. While England gradually
expanded the role of defense counsel at trial over succeeding generations,
American courts began permitting a defendant's counsel to provide complete assistance throughout the trial.58 Following the signing of the Declaration of Independence, several states confirmed the adversarial approach
50. Alschuler, supranote 32 at 4-5.
51. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969).
52. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before England,
14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 324 (2009).
53. Id. at 324-25.
54. Id. at 325.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 327.
58. Id.
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and the critical role of defense counsel in their own state constitutions.59
The Founding Fathers also memorialized this adversarial method at the
federal level through the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 60 As
one scholar has observed, this form of "[o]rdered conflict is a desirable
element of a free and diverse society, not some lingering social disease that
should be eradicated. There is a virtue as well as a necessity in ordered conflict that serves vital social purposes." 61
The adversary system of criminal justice involves both prosecution and
defense in the investigatory stage of trial, where each side is equally able to
deliver evidence along with arguments in front of an impartial
decisionmaker.62 The system is founded in part on the belief that the adversary system renders justice more accurately. Its "current ideology extols the
adversary system primarily as the best system for protecting individual dignity and autonomy, but some theorists continue to profess the original ideology, which says that adversarial presentation and argument are the best
way to arrive at the truth.63 While intended to serve the aim of truth, the
Founding Fathers also recognized the need to protect individual liberty,
incorporating the right to a fair trial as the ultimate safeguard against the
government's abuse of power.64 As noted by scholar David Barnhizer:
The adversary system is the mechanism by which we balance the inevitable and often healthy disputes between factions. As our political system
has become increasingly complex and factious the adversary system's
processes of ordered conflict have become even more vital. If the truth be
known, most of us would prefer the noise and irritation of contention to
the silence and subordination of tyranny. 65
Unfortunately, the plea bargaining process has in fact emasculated this
right: only one party now has access to evidence before a plea is negotiated,
and only one party gets to argue its version of the case. By contrast, the
adversary system of justice is individualistic and allows for reflection of
social values: each party is given a fair chance to use its self-interest and
deliver the most beneficial evidence and argue its best case. 66 Self-interest
then motivates the defendant to inform the jury of his or her own version of
events.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. David Barnhizer, The Virtue of OrderedConflict: A Defense of the Adversary System, 79 NEB.
L. REV. 657, 660 (2000).
62. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301,
302 (1989).
63. Id.
64. Barnhizer, supranote 61, at 660.
65. Id.
66. Sward, supranote 62, at 313.
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While the American adversary system is not perfect, the Founding Fathers regarded it as superior to England's skewed practice favoring prosecu67
tors. 6 In Lochner v. New York, Justice Holmes observed, the Constitution
"is made for people of fundamentally differing views[.]" 68 As David
Barnhizer observed, "[t]he legal system is not a self-contained theoretical
construct of ideal justice, but reflects, diffuses, and balances competing
claims for political and economic power. 6 9 The adversary system of justice,
rooted in common law and constitutionally required in the United States,
should be contrasted with the inquisitorial system of justice in many civil
law countries.7 0 In the inquisitorial system, the parties do not control the
legal process, but a supposedly impartial judge takes an active role as a fact
finder and decisionmaker.7 ' Such a legal system is much "more communitarian than individualistic." 72 The goal of the inquisitorial system is not to
guarantee individual liberties but, instead, to "seek the socially correct solution." 73
Modem day plea bargaining in America resembles the inquisitorial system of justice in continental Europe. Yet, this "quasi-inquisitorial" system
lacks many of the safeguards designed to curb abuse in an inquisitorial system. For example, in American plea bargaining, it is the prosecutor, rather
than a jury, who serves as the primary fact finder.74 While judges in continental Europe may be engaged in the fact finding and case resolution process, most American judges are only involved in the formalities of accepting the plea agreement and meting out a sentence.7 1 In addition to demand76
ing "substantial assistance" from the defendant, most plea agreements
require that a defendant "waives several important constitutional rightsthe right to a jury trial, the right to confront his accusers, and the privilege
67. Jonakait, supra note 52, at 327.
68. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
69. Barnhizer, supranote 61, at 662.
70. Sward, supranote 62, at 313.
71. Id. at 313.
72. Id. at 315. Sward argues that "individualism untempered by communitarian values can lead to
unremitting selfishness, including an utter lack of concern for the consequences of one's action." Id. at
311. However, in the author's personal experience, having been raised in the communitarian value
system of the Soviet Union, self-interest is a natural human instinct that can be just as pronounced, if not
more so, in a communitarian environment. The author witnessed firsthand how guaranteed outcomes
and common ownership remove the social stigma of selfishness.

73. Id. at 315.
74. See Rakoff, supra note 4.
75. Id.
76. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (2004) ("Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines."). See also
Colin Miller, Deal or No Deal: Why Courts Should Allow Defendants to PresentEvidence that They

Rejected FavorablePlea Bargains, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 407, 453 (2011) ("[P]rosecutors can offer plea
bargains in exchange for such substantial assistance[.]").
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against self-incrimination."." Modem American plea bargain practice is a
perverted situation in which "judge and prosecutor seem to have formed a
partnership."
Judges openly defer to prosecutors, rarely challenging plea
agreements and frequently following prosecutors' sentencing recommendations. 7
Plea bargains are meant to process convictions rather than allow juries to
decide the outcomes of cases, departing from the adversary approach to
justice required under the Constitution.so The plea bargain process enables
prosecutors to act on what would otherwise be inadmissible evidence at
trial (e.g., hearsay) in order to fashion a plea bargain and make sentencing
recommendations to the court.' A defendant in the modem American legal
system faces two sets of injustices brought about by the use of prejudicial
and 8inadmissible
evidence: upon indictment and subsequently at sentenc2
ing.
B.
Plea BargainingIs Merely a Tool ofExpediency and Convenience,
Not Justice
Plea bargaining now purports to be an "inextricable part"8 3 of the modern
criminal justice system, saving time and limited judicial and prosecutorial
resources.84 Nevertheless, convenience and expediency cannot provide an
adequate substitute for the guarantee of trial by an impartial jury under the
U.S. Constitution. The United States District Court for the State of Massachusetts recently observed that:
Plea bargaining is no longer a negligible exception to the norm of trials; it
is the norm. Nor, given information deficits and pressures to bargain, can
we simply trust in an efficient plea market that reflects full information
about expected trial outcomes. Thus, plea bargaining needs tailored regulation in its own right, not simply a series of waivers of trial rights.8 5
Unfortunately, the modern purpose of plea bargaining is too administrative,
dispensing of any determination whether the government has met the constitutionally required evidentiary burden of "beyond the reasonable
77. Parker, supra note 9, at 197.
78. Black, supra note 4.
79. Id.
80. Rakoff, supra note 4.
81.

See Roger C. Park, ProceduralOptionsfor Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.

929,931 (1991).
82. See Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on
the DiscretionofSentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1724-25 (1992).
83. Philip H. Pennypacker & Alyssa Thompson, Realignment: A View from the Trenches, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 991, 1019 (2013).
84. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
85. United States v. Merlino, 109 F. Supp.3d 368, 369 (D. Mass. 2015).
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doubt." 8 6 This "nontrial mode of procedure" 7 does nothing to ascertain
truth or serve justice. Almost all defendants in federal criminal cases are
sentenced without the benefit of a jury trial, notwithstanding past admonition by the U.S. Supreme Court:
The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before
depriving a man of [] more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the
modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors, rather than a lone employee of
the State.8 9
In the eighteenth century, Sir William Blackstone90 foresaw enticements that now affect the way plea bargaining is conducted in the United States. He noted that "[e]xpedience may induce 'secret machinations,
which may sap and undermine' the jury trial . . . as doubtless all arbitrary
powers, well executed, are the most convenient."91
Blackstone presciently pointed out that "delays, and little inconveniences
in the forms of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their
liberty in more substantial matters." 92 Implied in Blackstone's observation
is the idea that sacrificing justice for the sake of expediency ultimately diminishes liberty.
The irony here is that, in civil practice, the United States Supreme Court
has declared, under the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," that the
government cannot require a person - for the sake of convenience or expediency - to give up a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary
benefit conferred by the government. 93 While analogizing Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment land use case law to the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial escapes easy analysis, there is a core notion embedded in Supreme
Court precedent: a property owner cannot be required to sacrifice constitutional rights at the discretion of government regulators where there is no
nexus between the right sacrificed and the government objective being
served. 94 In the context of plea bargains, one may reasonably question 95
86. United States v. Alldredge, 350 F.Supp. 189, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
87. John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 261, 261 (1979).
88. Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of
PleaBargainingCritics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 753 (1998).
89. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
90. Sir Blackstone was a respected scholar who helped to codify portions of English common law.
Shipler, supranote 3 at 108.
91. Id. (emphasis omitted).
92. Id. at 108.
93. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
94. Id.
95. Alschuler, supranote 32 at 3. As Alschuler observed:
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whether the government can exact a waiver of one's constitutional right to a
jury trial for the mere sake of lightening the workload of prosecutors and
judges.96
The adversary system that was meant to protect the average citizen
from the tyranny of its own government is now being abandoned for the
mere sake of expediency and the selfish career goals of some prosecutors.
Transparency is missing from the current system given that plea bargains
are typically negotiated outside open court proceedings. Inferentially, the
government lacks sufficient evidence to meet the requisite burden of proof
in 97% of criminal cases 97 by relying exclusively on plea bargains to obtain
convictions. If prosecutors truly seek justice, they should not rely on the
secrecy of plea bargain negotiations. The constitutionally required burden
of proof for conviction was not an incidental development in law, but rather
a thoughtful and necessary check to prevent abuse and government overreach. If the plea bargaining process is not brought out into the clear light of
day, there is no curb on this form of abuse.
Notwithstanding the universal use of plea bargains to obtain convictions,
there is practically no independent and unbiased oversight from the judiciary, much less the free press. 98 Rather, "as the circle widens to ensnare ever
more 'conspirators,' prosecutors trumpet their willingness to 'go wherever
the evidence leads,' and the news media are, far more often than not, prepared to report such news without an ounce of insight or skepticism. 99
C.
Rise ofModern Plea Bargaining:The Impact ofSentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums
The legal climate in which plea bargains first gained traction did not
criminalize many of the activities that constitute modem day white-collar
crimes, such as insider trading, tax evasion, accounting fraud, and money
laundering. Congress passed'0 0 the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 specifically to increase penalties for narcotics violations and endorse mandatory
In the same way that a prosecutor can relieve caseload pressure through plea bargaining, an instructor
can alleviate "bluebook backlog" through grade bargaining, and just as it is in a defendant's interest to
secure a favorable sentence, it is in a student's interest to secure a favorable grade. Despite the impulses
to engage in grade bargaining that both teachers and students may experience, we surely would not
regard this process as natural or inevitable. If it arose, we would, to the contrary, view it as a corruption
of the grading process.
Id. n.10.
96. Shipler, supra note 3 at 115. (noting one case in which a "DA offered [defendant] a five-year
sentence if he pleaded guilty to 'save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial."').
97. Rakoff, supranote 4.
98. Id.
99. Silverglate, supra note 16 at xlvi.
100.

WILLIAM R. KELLY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 71 (2015).
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minimums for violent offenders.' 0' The Act signaled an increased application of the federal sentencing guidelines,1 02 which called for severe sentences at the federal level.1 03 Mandatory minimum sentencing laws and sentencing guidelines were also established to limit the discretion of judges considered too lenient.1 04 However, this did not resolve disparities in sentencing.10 As a result of sentencing laws, the power shifted from federal judges
to federal prosecutors.106
Moreover, sentencing guidelines of that era constrained punishment for
white-collar crimes to relatively brief prison sentences. 0 7 The few whitecollar convicts sentenced to longer terms in prison could nevertheless qualify for parole after serving one third of their sentence.'s Plea bargaining at
that time "was like a discussion at a gentleman's table."1 09
D.
The Law of UnintendedConsequences: Infringing on Constitutional Rights of Defendants
As the use of plea bargains increased, the constitutionality of their use
was challenged. In 1970, the Supreme Court in United States v. Brady upheld plea bargaining as a constitutional method of resolving violent criminal cases." 0 What the Court was not asked to consider in 1970, and what it
therefore did not elaborate on, was whether plea bargaining raises constitutional issues in its application to non-violent and non-drug-related crimes.
In Brady, the Court outlined the "voluntariness" and "intelligent choice"
requirements for a plea to withstand constitutional challenge. " In the context of drug crimes, the plea bargain offers benefits for both parties."12
Likewise, with respect to relatively straightforward and common law

101.

Id.at 71-72.

102. Id. at 72.
103.

Id.

104.

ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 7 (2007).

105. Id. at 8.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 201 (3rd Cir. 2008).
108. According to the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court: "There is a better way. We
need to move from anger-based sentencing that ignores cost and effectiveness to evidence-based sentencing that focuses on results-sentencing that assesses each offender's risk and then fits that offender
with the cheapest and most effective rehabilitation that he or she needs." Ray Price Jr., Chief Justice,
Missouri Supreme Court, State of the Judiciary Address: Your Missouri Courts (Feb. 3, 2010),
http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/2010%20state%/2Oof%20the%/20judiciary%/20%20WRP%2002-03-10%20-%20final%20(2)_1.pdf.
109. Black, supra note 4.
110. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970).

111. Id. at 748.
112. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71.
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crimes," 3 a defendant seems better positioned to evaluate his chances of an
adverse verdict and to "voluntarily" bargain with prosecutors.
Modern supporters of plea bargaining rely on the analytical framework of
Brady, maintaining that plea bargains benefit both sides and pass constitutional muster.11 4 However, this rationale ignores the reality of modern plea
bargaining, particularly with respect to white-collar crimes involving undecided and controversial legal issues. Modern financial crimes involve an
element of dishonest behavior: e.g., fraud, tax evasion, insider trading. Notably, many white-collar crimes are non-violent offenses that challenge the
prosecution to establish more complex elements of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. "'

An unsophisticated defendant charged with a crime such as murder or unlawful narcotics distribution has a general idea of what evidence prosecutors may hold. In contrast, a white-collar criminal may not even be fully
aware of the nature of the charges and is heavily dependent on the competency of defense counsel in a complex criminal case. Furthermore, the defendant in a complex criminal case depends on the availability of financial
resources to procure competent representation, but often those resources are
subject to an asset freeze order.11 6 Not surprisingly, Alex Kozinski, former
Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, criticized the aggressive
application of criminal law in complex cases, stating, "[t]his is not the way
criminal law is supposed to work. Civil law often covers conduct that falls
in a gray area of arguable legality. But criminal law should clearly separate
conduct that is criminal from conduct that is legal."" 7
For example, few legal professionals are truly conversant in the multiple
volumes of statutes and regulations comprising the Internal Revenue
Code." In 1913, the first year in which one of the major law reporting
services began publishing the Internal Revenue Code, an entire volume
occupied roughly 400 pages." 9 Today, that exact same service spans 25
volumes comprising a total of 73,954 pages.1 20 Yet, at law, every single
citizen, as well as foreigners who spend a sufficient number of days in the
113. Vogel, supranote 31 at 95. "Guilty pleas, the first element of bargaining, began to be entered
in more significant numbers in common law-based cases during the late 1830s."
114. Blackledge,431 U.S. at7l.
115. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-BasedCeilings, 82
TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1266 (2008).
116. Kelly C. Quinn, Just Taking, LOS ANGELES LAWYER 20 (July 2011).
117. Silverglate, supra note 16 at xxi-xxii.
118. Wolters Kluwer, Tweet This: The Modern Income Tax Turns 100, CCH Takes a Look
Back.. .and Ahead, (Feb. 25, 2013) http://news.cchgroup.com/2013/02/25/tweet-this-the-modernincome-tax-turns-100-cch-takes-a-look-back-and-ahead/.
119. Id..
120. Id.
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United States each year or who draw income from United States sources,
are presumed to know the exact dictates of these almost 74,000 pages of
complex laws and regulations. Furthermore, every taxpayer is required to
file a return, signed under penalty of prosecution, that their filings are completely accurate.121

It can be difficult to clearly distinguish between aggressive tax planning
and criminal behavior1 22 . A defendant indicted for the white-collar crime of
tax evasion is disadvantaged by the limits of his own knowledge of the subtleties of tax laws. Yet, this same defendant is pressured to take a plea in a
very short period of time. Weighing on this decision is the reality that, even
if the risk of conviction by a jury is modest, the prosecutor can obtain a
sentence that frequently "spirals out of control."1 23 Federal sentencing
guidelines permit the court to lengthen the sentence based on the amount of
the financial loss, which can lead to absurdly long sentences exceeding
one's lifetime.1 2 4
The Justice Department further emboldens federal prosecutors to enforce
"utterly formless 'anti-fraud' laws"1 25 in order to intimidate forthright business executives and other professionals, as much as average citizens. In
2003, Michael Chertoff, the former second in command of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, impudently announced that federal prosecutors should exploit anti-fraud laws in order to indict business executives
because "criminal prosecution is a spur for institutional reform."1 26 Prosecutors armed with a variety of vague statutes may pursue virtually any citizen; "[e]ven the most intelligent and informed citizen (including lawyers
and judges, for that matter) cannot predict with any reasonable assurance
whether a wide range of seemingly ordinary activities might be regarded by
federal prosecutors as felonies.1 27 Once caught in the prosecutor's web, the
targeted professional faces the Hobson's choice of cooperating or facing
eternal punishment. Cooperating defendants "are taught not only to sing,
but also to compose"1 28 their witness testimony, enabling the prosecutor to
widen his net and bring in more defendants.1 29
But, is modem plea bargaining consistent with the constitutional underpinnings relied on in Brady, particularly as applied to modem day crimes?
121.

DEPT OF THE TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.: TAX GUIDE (2016).

122.

See M.H. Hoeflich, Of Reason, Gamesmanship, and Taxes: A Jurisprudential and Games

Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Voluntary Compliance, 2 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 9, 13 (1983).

123. Black, supranote 4.
124.

U.S.. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §21 .1 (2015).

125.

Silverglate, supra note 16 at xliv.

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Almost forty years ago, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes 30 , the Supreme Court
justified plea bargaining in part on the basis of relatively equal bargaining
powers, with both prosecutor and defendant making sacrifices in exchange
for benefits. The court affirmed the idea that "[p]lea bargaining flows from
the 'mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors, each with his
own reasons for wanting to avoid trial."131 By contrast, many decades later,
contemporary sentencing practice injects a substantial imbalance in relative
bargaining power between the prosecution and defendant, especially for
white-collar crimes, leaving little trace of the "mutually beneficial" aspect
of the "bargain."1 32 One former federal judge notes that, particularly in
federal cases, most defendants are practically forced to plead guilty. He
explains:
Indeed, there were times during my seventeen-year tenure on the federal
bench in Massachusetts that inquiring of a defendant as to the voluntariness of his guilty plea felt like a Kabuki ritual. "Has anyone coerced you
to plead guilty," I would ask, and I felt like adding, "like thumbscrews or
waterboarding? Anything less than that-a threatened tripling of your sentence should you go to trial, for example-doesn't count."13 3
There is no reasonable alternative to the plea bargain if the white-collar
defendant faces even the slightest risk of a potential life sentence.
Today, many innocent individuals, particularly in white-collar criminal
cases, are not benefitting at all from so-called "beneficial" plea offers and
would rather litigate the ever-expanding grey areas of the law if they did
not face such extreme jeopardy at sentencing.134 As a consequence of sentencing guidelines that impose harsh punishment on those who are convicted at trial, power is now concentrated in the hands of prosecutors. Brady is
simply outdated, leaving defendants helpless to the manipulation of prosecutors and the ever-expanding scope of new crimes to waive their constitutional right to trial. Statistics confirm that an alarming number of innocent
people plead guilty under a threat of a sentence three times higher than in
the plea agreement.1 35 As Judge Rakoff points out:
People accused of crimes are often offered five years by prosecutors or
face 20 to 30 years if they go to trial, . . . [t]he prosecutor has the information, he has all the chips . . . and the defense lawyer has very, very little
130. 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978).
131. Id. at 363.
132. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1935
(1992).
133. Nancy Gertner, Bruce Bower & Paul Shecltman, reply to Jed S. Rakoff, Why the Innocent
Plead Guilty: An Exchange, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (January 8, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/2015/jan/08/why-innocent-plead-guilty-exchange/.
134. Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?,63 DUKE L.J. 823, 841 (2014).
135. Rakoff, supra note 4.
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to work with. So it's a system of prosecutor power and prosecutor discretion. I saw it in real life [as a criminal defense attorney], and I also know it
in my work as a judge today. 13 6

III.

ABUSE AND CORRUPTION IN MODERN PLEA
BARGAINING

IrreconcilableDefects in Modern Plea Bargaining

A.

White-collar crimes are now almost exclusively prosecuted at the federal
level, where the applicable sentence upon conviction is draconian. 3 7 "Plea
bargaining is no longer a negotiation between equals,"' 38 but a Hobson's
choice in which the white-collar criminal defendant may (i) accept a certain
and unfortunate sentence premised on less than overwhelming evidence
concerning unresolved issues of law pursuant to a plea agreement, or (ii)
risk the severest of punishments meted out under a trebled sentence should
the defendant instead choose to be tried by a jury as guaranteed under the
Sixth Amendment. 3 9 As one scholar has noted:
Cases involving educated, well-to-do victims were frequently prosecuted
more vigorously than cases involving poor, uneducated victims. The very
few white defendants represented by my office sometimes appeared to receive preferential treatment from prosecutors. Although I saw no evidence
of intentional discrimination based on race or class, the consideration of
class- and race-neutral factors in the prosecutorial process often produced
disparate results along class and race lines.1 40

One such defect in modern plea bargaining concerns sentencing for financial crimes based on the size of the loss. Federal sentencing guidelines call
for many white-collar criminals to be punished based on the scope of financial loss incurred by their misdeeds.141 Adding insult to injury, the prosecutor need not prove that the loss was intended by the defendant; highly speculative yet objectively foreseeable losses may nevertheless be incorporated
4
into a sentencing recommendation.

2

136. Simon McCormack, Tens of Thousands of Innocent People Have Pled Guilty, Judge Jed
RakoffSays, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/29/thousandsinnocent-pled-guilty n_5412494.html (alteration in original).
137. Telephone Interview with F. Lee Bailey, renowned former trial lawyer (May 2015) (interview
notes on file with author).
138. Black, supra note 4.
139. See Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as FramersofPlea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
61, 63 (2015).
140. Davis, supra note 104 at 4-5.

§

141.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

142.

See Mirko Bagaric, Jean Du Plessis & Jaclyn Silver, Halting the Senseless Civil War Against

2Bl.1(b)

(2015).

White-Collar Offenders: "The Conduct Undermined the Integrity of the Markets" and Other Fallacies,

2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1019, 1035 (2016).
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This opens a door for prosecutors to manipulate the amount of loss,
yielding astonishing sentences under the guideline formulae.1 4 3 For example, Bernard Madoff received a 150-year prison sentence in 2009 after confessing to operating a $65 billion Ponzi scheme.1 44 Similarly, financier R.
Allen Stanford was sentenced to 110 years in prison for running a $7 billion
Ponzi scheme. 451In state courts, violent offenders convicted of murder or
intentional manslaughter face an average sentence of approximately 20
years.1 4 6 Many violent offenses command a far lower sentence under current federal guidelines.1 4 7
Whether a defendant murders a wealthy victim or a homeless person, the
sentence for the violent crime of murder is the same regardless of the financial condition of the victim. Likewise, the fact that the victim's death results
in substantial financial losses for innocent parties does not have any bearing
on the defendant's sentence. Rather, proper redress for financial damages
is best handled in civil court, not criminal court. Yet, two similarly-situated
white-collar criminal defendants can face enormous discrepancies in sentencing (upwards of fifty years in some cases) based solely on the amount
of financial loss claimed by prosecutors.1 48
The federal sentencing guidelines seek to curtail such absurdities by recommending that the "intended loss" for sentencing purposes be limited to
those losses that "the defendant purposely sought to inflict."1 4 9 Still, because of this focus on financial loss, the white-collar defendant faces a disparity in sentencing when compared to those defendants charged with
committing violent crimes,.5 o With modem plea bargain practice, violent
criminals arguably enjoy better treatment than their white-collar counterparts. Because financial loss is often not a significant factor in sentencing
for violent crimes, violent criminals stand to benefit from a shorter sentence
reached under a plea agreement.

&

143. See Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM.
MARY L. REV. 721, 728 (2005).
144. Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (June
29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html.
145. Clifford Krauss, Stanford Sentenced to 110-Year Term in $7 Billion Ponzi Case, N.Y. TIMES
(June 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/business/stanford-sentenced-to-110-years-in-jailin-fraud-case.html.
146. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, t.5.48.2006.
147. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.1. (2015)
148. United States v. Gupta, 904 F.Supp.2d 349, 351 (2012).
149. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 Application Note 3(A)(ii) (2015).
150. See Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 501, 515 (2004).
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Plea bargains are now used in modern practice to circumvent' 5 ' the the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial.1 52 Under the present system of
plea bargains, a convicted criminal, especially a white-collar criminal who
rejects a plea, is likely subjected to extended punishment for having availed
himself of the Sixth Amendment right to trial.1 53 Those defendants who
choose to go to trial and are convicted suffer, on average, sentences that are
three times longer than those who are instead sentenced pursuant to a plea
agreement.1 54 The use of plea bargains has impaired the Sixth Amendment
in modem day jurisprudence, creating a new crime called "trial.", 5 5
Post Civil War-era advocates of the widespread use of plea bargaining
fail to adequately consider the sheer power that plea bargains afford prosecutors in an era of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences.1 56 In the absence of defined guidelines, effective prosecutorial accountability and adequate scrutiny, 5 7 the widespread use of plea bargains in modern times5 8 has led to abuse and corruption 59 among judges, defense attorneys, and especially prosecutors:
Much of what passes for legal behavior might in fact be illegal, but because prosecutorial practices are so rarely challenged, it is difficult to define the universe of prosecutorial misconduct. Because it is so difficult to
discover, much prosecutorial misconduct goes unchallenged, suggesting
that the problem is much more widespread than the many reported cases
of prosecutorial misconduct would indicate. As one editorial described the
problem, "[ilt would be like trying to count drivers who speed; the problem is larger than the number of tickets would indicate." 1 60
As famed law professor and attorney Alan M. Dershowitz has observed,
"[p]rosecutors are supposed to be interested injustice: the motto on the wall
of the Justice Department proclaims that the government 'wins its point
151. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 143 (2012).
152. Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory
Brady Evidence DuringPlea Bargaining,81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3606-07 (2013).
153. See Bibas, supranote 143, at 728.
154. Nicole Flatow, FederalDrug Defendants Who Don't Plead Guilty Spend Three Time Longer
In Prison, Report Finds, THINKPROGRESS, (Dec. 5, 2013), https:/thinkprogress.org/federal-drugdefendants-who-dont-plead-guilty-spend-three-times-longer-in-prison-report-finds-5adc67411411
155. This term was coined by Professor Roy Black. See supra note 4.
156.

JOHN EMERICH EDWARD

DALBERG-ACTON,

HISTORICAL ESSAYS & STUDIES

504 (1907)

("Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.").
157. Rakoff, supranote 4.
158. Id. ("In 2013, while 8 percent of all federal criminal charges were dismissed ... more than 97
percent of the remainder were resolved through plea bargains, and fewer than 3 percent went to trial.
The plea bargains largely determined the sentences imposed.").
159. See Welsh S. White, A Proposalfor Reform of the Plea BargainingProcess, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 439, 463-64 (1971).
160. Davis, supranote 104, at 126.
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whenever Justice is done.' But in real life, many prosecutors reverse the
motto and believe that justice is done whenever the government wins its
point."161
The Supreme Court is partly to blame by imposing extremely high
thresholds 6 2 for judicial review of prosecutorial misconduct.1 63 Indeed:
The Court's rulings have sent a very clear message to prosecutors-we
will protect your practices from discovery; when they are discovered, we
will make it extremely difficult for challengers to prevail; and as long as
you mount overwhelming evidence against defendants, we will not reverse
their convictions if you engage in misconduct at trial. 164
Such jurisprudence shields prosecutors from any accountability, sanctioning
their actions as harmless error. A survey by the Center for Public Integrity
discovered only forty-four cases since 1970 in which prosecutors were held
accountable for misconduct that infringed on the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants. 165 The range of offending conduct included discovery
violations; improper contact with judges, witnesses, defendants, or jurors;
prosecuting cases without probable cause; harassing or threatening defendants; and using improper and misleading evidence. 166 In merely two of
those cases was the prosecutor actually disbarred.1 67
Furthermore, the white-collar criminal defense bar consists mostly
of former federal prosecutors who later become defense lawyers and who,
because of their past experience, know the extreme risks of choosing a trial
and challenging the indictment.1 68 They routinely advise their clients to take
a plea agreement, rationally opting not to challenge the government knowing full well how much the prosecution can stretch the law and stack the
counts.1 69
Prosecutors have absolute discretion17 0 throughout the plea-bargaining
process,' 7 ' choosing who to indict, what charges to bring,1 7 2 and whether to
161. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xvi (1982).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 83 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("We
have recognized that the harmless-error doctrine, denying any remedy in cases of clear prosecutorial
misconduct, can work very unfair and mischievous results.") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
163. Davis, supranote 104, at 127.
164. Id. at 130.
165. Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 291 (2007).
166. Id. at 291-92.

167. Id. at 292.
168.

Silverglate, supra note 16, at xlvi.

169. Id.
170. White, supra note 159, at 449.
171. Id. at 446 (reporting that one prosecutor's "assistant also noted that he would be more willing
to offer concessions to induce a plea if he considered the defendant's counsel personally objectionable.").
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stack the charges.1 73 Overcharging - a practice of tacking additional charges- is a common tool a prosecutor can wield for leverage in the pleabargaining process.1 74 Such practice offers a twofold advantage for the
prosecutor. First, with more charges on the menu, the prosecution enjoys a
distinct advantage at the plea-bargaining stage or even at trial "because the
additional charge or charges act as a 'backup' in case the jury fails to convict on the more relevant charges." 7 5 If all else fails, the prosecution will
most often resort to a conspiracy charge.1 7 6 It is understood that:
Prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system.
Their routine, everyday decisions control the direction and outcome of
criminal cases and have greater impact and more serious consequences
than those of any other criminal justice official. The most remarkable feature of these important, sometimes life-and-death decisions is that they are
totally discretionary and virtually unreviewable."'
Second, the prosecution is able to threaten defendants with draconian sentences under current sentencing guidelines. As one defense lawyer at the
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia[skPjemarked:
[P]rosecutors held almost all of the cards, and they seemed to deal them as
they saw fit. Although some saw themselves as ministers of justice and
measured their decisions carefully, very few were humbled by the power
they held. Most wanted to win every case, and winning meant getting a
conviction. 8
While a healthy degree of discretion is comprehensible and indispensable
for prosecutors in performing their duties, accountability - as a core constitutional value - demands a check on their authority. A prosecutor's "duty is
not to simply represent the state in the pursuit of a conviction but to pursue
justice. 'Doing justice' sometimes involves seeking a conviction and incarceration, but at other times, it might involve dismissing a criminal case or
forgoing a prosecution."179 Prosecutors enjoy unchecked discretionary
power to influence major stages of criminal legal proceedings while shielded from the public and accountable only to fellow prosecutors.8 0 Since
prosecutors hold such power, they need to be "held more accountable than

172. Shipler, supra note 3 at 115 ("[A] prosecutor can include or ignore elements of the crime. One
made a gun magically disappear from a string of robberies to lower the charges and get a guilty
plea[.]").
173. Id.
174. See Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 703 (2014).
175. Davis, supra note 104, at 31.
176. Black, supra note 4.
177. Davis, supra note, 104 at 5.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Id. at 13.
180. Id. at 164.
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other officials, not less."
Nevertheless, under modem plea bargaining,
"the judiciary, the legislature, and the general public have given prosecutors
a pass."182

Experience demonstrates that judges are not effective gatekeepers to filter the widespread use of plea bargains.' 83 Some judges naturally prefer to
accept a plea bargain than to preside over a long trial. 8 4 Judges openly defer to prosecutors and frequently follow their sentencing recommendations.'s This "partnership" between prosecutors and judges further undermines defendants' constitutional rights. As comedian Lenny Bruce summarizes: "The halls of justice. That's the only place you see the justice, is in
the halls."18 6
In 2003, a revision to the federal sentencing guidelines8 7 required that, in
order for a federal judge to issue a sentence lower than that specified in the
guidelines, the judge must file a written report stating the reasons for bypassing the guidelines. 18 This step by Congress limited judicial involvement by defacto threatening judges; it was understood that:
[I]f you dare to exercise judicial independence and stray from the mandates of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, you will have to justify your
actions, not only to Congress but to the prosecutors who appear before
you. Although federal judges have lifetime tenure, many critics of the
Feeney Amendment viewed it as a sort of "blacklist" that threatened judicial independence. 189
Some judges reacted with outrage and signed numerous petitions against
the Feeney Amendment.1 90 Judge Guido Calabresi of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted prosecutors in court over the matter,
stating:
You're telling me that the system we have set up, that has been set up by
Congress, which removes discretion from the judges, has given discretion
181. Id.at8.
182. Id.
183. According to one well-known jurist:
To take matters out of legislative hands, a rule must be in the Constitution-encoded in a way that
puts it beyond the choice of the living. What's going on here, however, is that Justices are changing the level of generality from the abstract to the concrete. Filling in details is a necessary task,
but why does it belong to the Court in a way that the legislature cannot review? When there's a
general statute, the Court goes exactly the opposite way: the agency, not the judiciary, gets extra
scope for choice.
Frank H Easterbrook, Plea Bargainingis a Shadow Market, 51 DUQUESNE L. REV. 551, 558 (2013).
184. Rakoff, supranote 4.
185. Black, supra note 4.
186. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 111 (Fred R. Shapiro ed.) (2006).
187.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2015).

188. Davis, supra note 104, at 109.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 109.
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to your office.... This case is a perfect example of you telling me that your
office made some decisions with respect to what is right and just and true,
and the district court is thereby prohibited from having any say in the matter.

19 1

Finally, in 2005, the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker' 92 rendered

the Feeney Amendment toothless. The Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was unconstitutional to the extent it requires that the
judge sentence a defendant to a period of imprisonment higher than the
statutory maximum subject to the judge's determination of certain facts by
a preponderance of the evidence. 193 Judges now consider the guidelines but
are allowed then to depart from those guidelines as long as they give their
reasons.1 9 4 Finally, sentences may be challenged on appeal and even overturned for unreasonableness.1 95

However, the sentencing guidelines continue to be religiously or
habitually used, even though judges have more freedom and are not technically bound by them.1 96 Also, cooperation agreements allow judges to radically reduce sentences.197 In reality, to this day, by shaping the plea agreement, prosecutors define the sentence for the defendant, compromising the
true ability of the judge to impartially review the charges. 198 Retired Federal Judge Nancy Gertner, Senior Lecturer on law, Harvard Law School, regrets the sentencing decisions given out over the span of her 17-year career,
reflecting:
80 percent [of my decisions] I believe were unfair and disproportionate. I
left the bench in 2011 to join the Harvard faculty to write about those sto-

191. Id. at 110.
192. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
193. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority on this issue, stated:
We answer the question of remedy by finding the provision of the federal sentencing statute that
makes the Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1) (Supp. IV), incompatible with today's
constitutional holding. We conclude that this provision must be severed and excised, as must one
other statutory section, §3742(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), which depends upon the Guidelines'
mandatory nature. So modified, the Federal Sentencing Act, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 991 et seq., makes the Guidelines effectively
advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, see 18 U.S.C. A.
§3553(a)(4) (Supp. 2004), but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns as well, see §3553(a) (Supp. 2004).
Id. at 245.
194. Davis, supra note 104, at 112.
195. Id.
196. See Norman C. Bay, ProsecutorialDiscretion in the Post-Booker World, 37 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 549, 564 (2006).
197. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1 (2015).
198. Rakoff, supra note 4.
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ries-to write about how it came to pass that I was obliged to sentence
people to terms that, frankly, made no sense under any philosophy.1 99
Just this year, the Appeals Court for the Twelfth Appellate District of Ohio
vacated a sentence found to reflect a "trial tax" imposed on a defendant. 2 0 0
In State v. Noble,201 the defendant declined to enter a plea agreement and
was subsequently convicted at trial. At sentencing, the trial court judge
imposed a lengthy prison sentence based, in part, on the fact that the defendant had neglected to enter into a plea agreement with prosecutors, stating, "[y]ou don't get the same kind of leniency you would have gotten if
you had just fessed up, taken responsibility and said, okay, I got caught, I
screwed up, now what's my prison sentence." 2 02 In deciding to vacate the
trial judge's sentence, the appeals court referred to earlier Ohio state court
rulings that had found unconstitutional those sentences designed to punish
defendants who choose to stand trial.203 In one such case, State v. O'Dell,
the court observed that "a defendant is guaranteed the right to a trial and
should never be punished for exercising that right[.]" 20 4 Likewise, in State
v. Seaf2 05 the court explained that "[t]he augmentation of sentence based
upon a defendant's decision to stand on his right to put the government to
its proof rather than plead guilty is improper." Citing this precedent, the
appeals court in Noble concluded that "[s]uch a sentence delivered unclearly does not shine brightly upon the fair and even administration of justice
206
required by law."

The overuse of plea bargains has even corrupted defense attorneys. 20 7 It
is easier to earn a fee for having concluded a plea agreement than to prepare
for and conduct a lengthy and unprofitable trial. Even the most ethical lawyer is challenged by Lafler v. Cooper208 to think twice before advising a
199. Nancy Gertner, Senior Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, Welcome and Opening Session
at the Aspen Ideas Festival (June 25, 2015), http://thefreethoughtproject.com/federal-judge-admits-drugwar-tearing-country-apart-regrets-80-rulings/#tCQ361WIE3XdFkO3.99.
200. State v. Noble, 2015-Ohio-652, 5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.
ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/12/2015/2015-Ohio-652.pdf.
201. Id. at 4.
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id. at 6.
204. State v. O'Dell, 543 N.E.2d 1220, 1227 (Ohio 1989).
205. State v. Scalf, 710 N.E.2d 1206, 1210-11 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
206. Noble, 2015-Ohio-652, 5-6.
207. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 (2012); See also Davis, supra note 104, at 57.
208. 566 U.S. at 174. According to one scholar:
In [Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012)] and Lafler, the Supreme Court reinstated plea offers after the defendants successfully claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The dissents in both cases predict that the Court's chosen remedy could result in further constitutional litigation with respect to plea bargaining, and that rather than solving a problem, the Court created a
new field of litigation.
Mike Work, Creating Constitutional Procedure: Frye, Lafler, and Plea Bargaining Reform, 104 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 459 (2014).
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client to refuse a plea offer, lest the lawyer be cited for rendering ineffective
assistance of counsel. Furthermore, mandatory minimum sentences invite
defense attorneys to advise their clients to take a plea offer that they may
have counseled against earlier.209 In support of defense counsel, they often
do not have time or resources to properly investigate the case, nor can they
discover weaknesses in the government's case under a plea offer made with
a demand for immediate acceptance or rejection. 210 A defendant may have
a strong defense, but his attorney may not have the time to evaluate the
viability of any defense properly.21
Moreover, evidence that is inadmissible at trial (e.g., hearsay evidence,
unqualified statements of opinion) is gathered by an arm of the court - the
probation department - following the plea agreement and used to formulate a sentencing recommendation.2 12 The probation department contacts
former employers, business partners, ex-spouses, and many other individuals who may harbor a grievance completely unrelated to any criminal activity. 213 As a result, material that would be inadmissible at the trial phase
under constitutional principles is admitted by the court for the purpose of
214
sentencing.
IV.
A.

FIXING THE BROKEN SYSTEM

DeterringOver-CriminalizationofNon- Violent Behavior

The wrinkles presented by plea bargaining in the era of unchecked prosecutorial power are nothing new. Legal scholars such as Blackstone foresaw
these same issues nearly two centuries ago,2 and the subject still stirs
heated debate. While there are no easy solutions to cure the slow deterioration of justice and expanded governmental power, there are a few ideas for
reform.
First, over-criminalizing is not effective if the modem criminal justice
system is unable to resolve ever-expanding crimes without violating the
U.S. Constitution. As observed by the United States Supreme Court in
Evitts v. Lucey, "[i]n short, when a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord
with the dictates of the Constitution and, in particular, in accord with the

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Davis, supra note 104, at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58.
Shipler, supra note 3, at 122-23.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 108.
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Due Process Clause." 2 16 Over-criminalizing a vast array of behaviors has
partly led to the current need for plea bargaining. Some laws, such as those
prohibiting fornication or adultery, "stay on the books long after social mores about these behaviors have changed." 2 17 Other laws are designed to
have the potential to be applied in a broader context than as perhaps originally envisioned. For example, it may make sense to prosecute a gambling
ring in a jurisdiction that prohibits it, "but not for individuals placing small
bets during a Saturday night poker game in a private home."218
In 2010, the conservative Heritage Foundation and the liberal National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) joined in the publication of "Without Intent", a report detailing a major shortcoming in Congress's drafting of criminal laws. 219 The report established that, of the 446
nonviolent and non-drug-related criminal laws proposed in the 109th Congress, more than 50% of these new "crimes" did not require the prosecutor
to establish that the defendant had acted with any criminal intent. 220 A separate analysis by civil rights attorney Henry Silverglate has determined that
the average citizen unknowingly commits threefederal crimes on any given
day.2 2 ' The vast array of potential crimes enables a prosecutor, at his or her
absolute discretion, to target any individual.222 As Robert H. Jackson, U.S.
Supreme Court Justice and Chief U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg stated, "[i]f
the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose
his defendants. Here one finds the most dangerous power of the prosecutor:
that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases
that need to be prosecuted." 2 23
If there are too many crimes on the books, and not enough space to uphold the constitutional rights of the accused, the penal statutes should yield
to the Constitution. Besides the exceedingly high number of crimes being
added every day, many current laws are vague and open to a liberal interpretation in favor of the government rather than the accused. Congress
should form a commission to review the scope of existing crimes with the
express purpose of winnowing the list of crimes that subject an accused to

216.
217.
218.
219.

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985).
Davis, supra note 104, at 13.
Id.
Edwin Meese III & Norman Reimer, Foreward to Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn,

WITHOUT INTENT:

How

CONGRESS

IS

ERODING

THE CRIMINAL

INTENT REQUIREMENT

IN

FEDERAL LAW, VI (2010).
220.

Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, WITHOUT INTENT: How CONGRESS IS ERODING THE

CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW, IX (2010).

221.
222.
223.

Alan M. Dershowitz, Forewardto Silverglate, supra note 16, at xvix.
Id.
Id.
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incarceration of a substantial period. As the Roman historian Tacitus stated
centuries ago, "The more corrupt the state, the more numerous the laws." 22 4
Second, just as every bad act should not necessarily be classified as a
crime punishable with imprisonment, not every crime should be resolved
through plea bargaining. There is some historic precedent for using plea
bargains to resolve common law criminal cases in which the weight of the
evidence more than sufficiently favors the prosecution. Historically, public
drunkenness was the common law crime most frequently resolved through
plea bargaining.225 By comparison, complex criminal cases involving unresolved issues of law, frequent in white-collar criminal cases, should not be
dispatched through plea bargaining.
Legal scholar Doug Lieh argues for the increased use of the doctrine of
vindictive prosecution: that a prosecutor should be prohibited from punishing a criminal defendant for having exercised the right to go to trial. 226 Lieh
contends that an updated vindictive prosecution standard needs to be adopted, "as a wrong would be responsive to salient problems in today's criminal
justice system." 2 27 He further proposes that greater use of the doctrine of
vindictive prosecution is feasible, "imposing boundaries on prosecutorial
discretion, valuing the constitutional right to trial, and permitting efficient
bargains-in minimally disruptive fashion." 2 2 8
B.

The "Texas Shoot Out": From the Boardroom to the Courtroom

If we analogize plea bargaining to a business transaction, perhaps one area of guidance is a form of cross-purchase agreement among shareholders
of a company that has been regarded for yielding equitable results: The
"Texas Shoot Out." 229 In this type of arrangement, one shareholder seeking
to purchase shares from another shareholder offers a price that creates both
a call and a call option: the offeror has a call right to purchase the shares at
the offer price, but - by virtue of making the offer to purchase - the offeree
230
acquires a call right on the offeror's own shares at that same offer price.
224. OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS, 289 (John Simpson & Jennifer
Speake eds., 5th ed. 2009). Tacitus is also quoted as saying: "Before, we had 'crimes' that oppressed us;
Now, we have
'laws' that oppress us."
"T"
Quotes On Power, ONPOWER.ORG
http://www.onpower.org/quotes/t.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2017).
225.

See Robert Schehr, The Emperor's New Clothes: Intellectual Dishonesty And The Unconstitu-

tionality ofPlea-Bargaining,2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 385, 386 (2015).
226.

Doug Lieb, Note, Vindicating Vindictiveness: ProsecutorialDiscretion and Plea Bargaining,

PastandFuture, 123 YALE L.J. 1014, 1021 (2014).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Manie,Spoelstra, The 'Texas Shoot Out' And Other Ways To
MEDIATE.COM (June 2009), http://www.mediate.com/articles/spoelstra6.cfm.
230. Id.
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Under these terms, the offeror needs to consider that too low a purchase
price will entice the offeree to purchase the offeror's shares at that low
price. 23
A similar method with plea bargains would be one where the prosecutor
can "call" the defendant to plead guilty and accept punishment under the
terms of a plea agreement; simultaneously, the defendant can compel the
prosecutor to "put" the charges, opting for a trial in which the charges contained in the plea agreement are the only charges the defendant can face.
The prosecutor cannot "stack" additional charges if the defendant chooses
to avail himself of a trial. Nor can the prosecutor offer a plea agreement
under any other terms except those that limit the charges the prosecutor can
bring if the defendant turns down the plea offer.
Some may argue that this scheme would discourage prosecutors from offering plea bargains, but that is the point of this exercise. Restricting the
use of the plea bargain under this approach requires that the prosecutor have
confidence in its case before offering a plea. Likewise, the defendant would
not be penalized for having availed himself of the right to trial under the
Sixth Amendment.23 2 Those prosecutors who are focused on furthering justice, and not just on advancing their personal careers by winning points,
should not have difficulty with such a modest modification of the "bargain."
V.

CONCLUSION

Plea bargaining is not evil in and of itself. However, the overuse of plea
bargaining has vaporized those individual protections constitutionally guaranteed through our adversary legal system. If plea bargains are systemically
important to the criminal justice system, it is equally true that the Constitution requires that counsel engage in plea bargaining to serve the best interests of the defendant. Rather than leaving defendants to the mercy of prosecutors, courts should seek to enforce new constitutional protections, including a bar on secret negotiations, to curb abuse in the plea bargaining
231. Spoelstra's description of the Texas Shoot Out is a reverse of this, but with similar effect: The
offeror names a price at which he is willing to sell his shares, creating a put right in the offeree to demand that the offeror instead purchase the offeree's shares at that price. The offeror needs to consider
that demanding too high a sales price might require that the offeror buy out the other shareholder at that
price. Id.
232. Shipler believes that the Sixth Amendment owes its origin to a fundamental value persisting
throughout the history of Western society:
From Athens, which assembled a jury of some five hundred for the trial of Socrates, the concept
passed to early Rome with jurors drawn from the ranks of nobles, and into the Magna Carta's
guarantee that "no freeman is to be taken or imprisoned ...
save by lawful judgment of his peers
or by the law of the land.
Shipler, supra note 3, at 107.
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process. If plea bargains are so essential to the U.S. modern criminal system that 97% of cases end up in plea agreements, then the focus should
shift to filtering cases for "grey-litigious areas of the law and unresolved
state of mind related charges," including crimes mala prohibita,23 3 which
should instead be submitted to trial.234 As Chief Justice Ryan said in Wight
v. Rindskopf
The profession of law is not one of indirection, circumvention, or intrigue.
. . Professional function is exercised in the sight of the world.. . . Private
preparation goes to this, only as sharpening the sword goes to battle. Professional weapons are wielded only in open contest. No weapon is professional which strikes in the dark. . . . Justice will always bear litigation; litigation is . . . the safest test of justice.2 3 5

All other crimes, including those mala in se,
should be resolved through
plea bargains negotiated in a more balanced environment, with evidence
fully exchanged before a plea may be offered. Furthermore, the drastic disparity in sentences between those convicted at trial and those entering a
plea should be eliminated.
One suggested business model for leveling the bargaining powers would
bring both parties to the position where each side has something to win and
lose. "[I]t is important to formulate guidelines which retain the advantages
yet minimize the undesirable consequences of plea bargaining." 23 7 According to Professor Davis of American University's Washington College of
Law:
In sum, neither the history of the development of the American prosecutor
nor an examination of the intent of the framers of the Constitution justifies
the current model of the prosecution function. Our system of checks and
balances has proven ineffective in restraining prosecutorial power [especially in regards to plea bargaining]. The judicial branch has failed to

233. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a crime malumprohibitum means,
A wrong prohibited; a thing which is wrong because prohibited; an act which is not inherently
immoral, but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law; an act
involving an illegality resulting from positive law.
Malaprohibita,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
234. As Thomas Jefferson profoundly stated, "I consider trial by jury as the only anchor yet devised
by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution." Shipler, supra note 3,
at 106.
235. Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 356-57 (1877).
236. A crime malum in se is defined as:
A wrong in itself; an act or case involving illegality from the very nature of the transaction, upon
principles of natural, moral, and public law ... An act is said to be malum in se when it is inherently and essentially evil, that is, immoral in its nature and injurious in its consequences, without
any regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the state.
Mala in se, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
237. White, supra note 159, at 441.
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check prosecutorial overreaching, and the legislative branch traditionally
has passed laws that increase prosecutorial power.23 8
The modern plea bargaining system requires reform so as to restore the
defendant's right to trial and the adversary process that is an essential aspect of trial. The right to trial pursuant to an adversary system of justice
validates our nation's character as much as it serves to satisfy requirements
under the U.S. Constitution. Indeed:
The presumption of innocence, the rights to counsel and confrontation, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and a variety of other trial rights, matter not only as devices for achieving or avoiding certain kinds of trial outcomes, but also as affirmations of respect for the accused as a human being-affirmations that remind him and the public about the sort of society
we want to become and, indeed, about the sort of society we are. 239

238. Davis, supra note 104, at 164-65.
239. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematical Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1392 (1971).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2017

31

